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On Truisms  and Constitutional  Obligations:
A Response
David A.  Strauss* & Cass R.  Sunstein**
In  our  essay  on  the  confirmation  process  of  Supreme  Court
Justices,'  we sought to support four propositions:
1.  The current confirmation process is working poorly.2
2.  In  a  development  that  is  without  precedent  in  our  history,
presidents  of a single party made  eleven  consecutive  appointments to the
Supreme Court, even though the Senate, except for a brief period of time,
was controlled  by  another party.3  This development  threatened  to create
a Court that lacks the appropriate range of views on constitutional  issues.4
3.  The Constitution contemplates an independent role for the Senate
in deciding whether  to consent to presidential  nominations  Such a role
would be especially  desirable under the conditions described  in (2),  even
if  it leads  to  the  rejection  of nominees  because  of their  likely  voting
patterns.
4.  The Constitution authorizes the Senate to advise the President on
prospective nominees to the Court.6  It would be especially appropriate for
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1.  David A.  Strauss &  Cass R.  Sunstein,  The  Senate, the  Constitution, and the  Confirmation
Process, 101  YALE L.J.  1491  (1992).
2.  See id. at  1491.
3.  See id. at  1503-04.
4.  The election of a President and a Senate majority of the same political party in 1992 means that
our arguments are now largely moot-likely to have little practical significance in the immediate future.
The distinctive circumstances that justified an active senatorial role no longer exist.  The circumstances
we describe, however, could recur (as they did after the period 1977-1981, when one party controlled
both the presidency  and the  Senate);  or they  might arise in  a  slightly  different  form  if important
jurisprudential  rifts developed between the Senate and the executive.
5.  See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1494.
6.  See id. at 1494-95.Texas Law Review
the  Senate to  assume  such  a  role,  given our  recent  experience,  both to
decrease the level of distraction and  antagonism in the recent nomination
proceedings7 and to produce greater quality and diversity on the Court.
Professor  McGinnis's  vigorous  response  does  not take issue with
proposition  (1),  says  little  about  proposition  (2),'  and  explicitly  agrees
with our reading of the Constitution  in proposition  (3),  which  is the heart
of our paper.9  The principal subject of his article is proposition (4).
Professor  McGinnis  advances two  principal arguments  against our
suggestion  that  the  Senate  should  advise  the  President  on  prospective
nominees  to the Court.  The first is that the Constitution contemplates  no
"formal  prenomination  advisory  role" for the Senate'  but "reserves  the
act  of  nomination  exclusively  to  the  President.""  If we  understand
Professor McGinnis correctly,  we have no disagreement with him on this
point;  indeed,  he  is obviously right.  We do  disagree,  however,  that his
demonstration of this point undermines  our position.
Professor  McGinnis's  second argument  is that the President has a
constitutional  obligation not to appoint anyone out of a desire to compro-
mise  with  the  Senate  on  legal  philosophy.12  The President,  Professor
McGinnis says, violates his oath of office if he appoints someone who does
not share his  approach  to constitutional  interpretation. 3  Here we really
do have a disagreement; we think Professor McGinnis's argument is unper-
suasive on this score.
I.  A  "Formal"  Role?
Professor McGinnis argues extensively that the President alone has
the power to nominate candidates for the Supreme Court.  He marshals  a
7.  Our essay referred particularly to the emphasis placed on the nominee's telegenic qualities, to
distortions of Judge Robert Bork's record, to the effects of television on some Senators' behavior,  and
to the uninformative generalities offered by  some recent nominees.  See id. at 1518-19,  1518 n.107,
1519 n.110.
8.  Professor McGinnis  briefly  argues that  intellectual diversity  is  an unnecessary  goal for the
Supreme  Court,  on  the  grounds  that  liberal  law  professors  and  others  will  offer  criticism  of
conservative outcomes,  and that persuasion of one justice by another is rare.  See John 0.  McGinnis,
The  President, the Senate, the  Constitution, and the Confirmation Process:  A  Reply  to  Professors
Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX.  L.  REV.  633,  650-52 (1993).  These premises may be right,  but we
think that there remains a  need for diversity within the Court.  It is important for Justices of varying
views to confront  one another  in  conference,  outside of conference,  and during  the circulation  of
opinions.  This is a valuable internal check on both arguments and outcomes.
9.  See id. at 653  ("The  Senate is 'independent'  in that it may legitimately  refuse to confirm  a
nominee who, in the opinion of the majority of the Senate, holds fundamentally incorrect principles of
constitutional interpretation.").
10.  Id. at 642;  see also id. at 638-46.
11.  Id.  at 645.
12.  See id. at 635.
13.  See id.
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great  deal  of evidence  to support this claim,  and he criticizes  us for not
discussing some of this evidence.
But of course we do not deny that the power to nominate rests with
the  President  alone.  We  do  not  suggest  that the  nomination power  is
shared.  If the President makes a nomination without seeking or accepting
advice from the Senate, the nomination is no less effective.  If this is what
Professor  McGinnis  is  saying  when  he  insists  that  the  Senate  has  no
"constitutional prenomination advisory role,""'  then we have no disagree-
ment with him; nothing we said suggests a Senate role in this sense.
Professor McGinnis,  for his  part,  does not insist on the hermetic
separation  of the Senate  and the President;  on the contrary,  he seems  to
acknowledge  that the President may consult with the Senate on nominees
"out  of  comity  or  political  prudence.""5  Our  disagreement  might
therefore  appear  to  be  quite  narrow:  he  admits  that  consultation  is
sometimes  a good idea,  and we do not claim that consultation is formally
necessary  to make  a nomination effective.
We suspect, however, that our disagreement is more significant than
that.  Especially in conditions of prolonged divided government,  we think
that consultation between the President and the Senate is more than just a
matter  of  "political  prudence."  If  the  Senate  has,  and  exercises,  an
independent role in considering  nominees-and Professor  McGinnis  says
that it is entitled to do so-consultation is a necessary means of establishing
a workable  and  sensible appointments  process.  Whether that makes  it a
"constitutional  obligation"'S-the  issue  to  which  Professor  McGinnis
attaches such significance-seems  to us practically an unimportant question
and  theoretically  one  of doubtful  coherence.  Under  the conditions  we
discuss in our essay, conditions of long-term divided government  in which
one party's Presidents have made an extraordinary number of consecutive
appointments,  the President and  the  Senate are not properly  discharging
their roles in the constitutional  scheme unless  they consult about nomina-
tions.
Suppose, for example, that a President repeatedly vetoed bills passed
by  Congress  without  letting  Congress  know  ahead  of  time  what  his
objection was, even though the objection might have been met easily by an
amendment.  Congress would then have to repass the bill, guessing (on the
basis of the  President's veto  message) precisely what  amendment  would
satisfy  the  President.  As  a  result,  the  legislative  process  would  be
wastefully delayed and disrupted.  Surely we would say that the President,
by failing to make his objections known while the bill was pending, did not
14.  Id. at 638.
15.  Id. at 646.
16.  Id.Texas Law Review
carry out his duty to make the Constitution a workable scheme.  Whether
this is characterized  as a duty of "comity,"  or instead as a "constitutional
obligation,"  does  not really  matter.  It would be the President's respon-
sibility-notwithstanding the undoubted fact that the Constitution does not
say that the President may play a role in congressional  consideration of a
bill,  and even though the President certainly has no formal  role before a
bill is presented for his signature.
Our suggestion is that consultation with  the Senate about Supreme
Court appointments is,  under conditions of prolonged divided government,
a similar sort of responsibility.  Professor McGinnis's extended discussion
of the history  of the Appointments  Clause  is essentially  irrelevant to this
relatively  modest  claim.'7  Professor  McGinnis  finds  a  number  of
instances  in which people  emphasized  the President's power to nominate
candidates of his own choosing; but nothing in our argument is inconsistent
with that truism."
Professor McGinnis has  also not persuaded  us that the language of
the  Appointments  Clause  argues  against  our  view.  That  language  is
unavoidably  awkward,  at least to the modem ear:  "[The  President]  shall
nominate,  and  by  and  with the Advice  and  Consent  of the Senate,  shall
appoint...  Judges of the supreme Court....  "19  Professor McGinnis's
explanation is that "[t]he  Senate's consent is advisory because confirmation
does not bind the President to commission ...  the confirmed nominee."'
This  is a plausible  explanation of the wording of the text,  but it has the
serious  drawback  of  making  the  key  word-"Advice"-redundant:  the
"advisory"  character  of  the  Senate's  consent  is  fully  secured  by  the
separation of nomination and  appointment.
Our interpretation is,  of course, also not free of textual difficulties.
We do note, however, that Professor McGinnis's own misunderstanding of
our position suggests an explanation of why "advice"  is not directly linked
with "nominate"  in the Clause:  if the Clause specified that the President,
"with the Advice of the Senate, shall nominate,"  then questions might arise
17.  We  are grateful  to Professor McGinnis for correcting some errors in identifying the first names
of certain delegates.  Id. at 639 n.29.  We do not believe, however, that these errors  are relevant to
the correctness of the propositions discussed in our essay.
18. Thus  Professor McGinnis's  detailed  discussion  of related  issues  in  The  Federalist  Papers
confirms proposition (3)  and does not speak to proposition (4).  Professor McGinnis is concerned about
our omission of George Mason's reference to the President's  exclusive right of nomination.  See id.
at 644-46.  But we do not at all deny what Mason was asserting-that the President alone has the power
to make an effective nomination-and we continue to be unable to see how Mason's statement of that
truism bears on the question of prenomination advice.  For the same reason, none of the quotations in
Professor McGinnis's response suggests that Congress is disabled from offering prenomination advice.
Advice is only that;  it does not bind  anyone, much  less force the President to nominate  someone of
whom he disapproves.
19.  U.S.  CONSr.  art. II,  § 2.
20.  McGinnis, supra note 8,  at 639.
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about whether  a nomination was  effective (even  if it was  consented to by
the Senate)  if the President  did not obtain  the proper  form  of "advice"
before making it.  Further, our position does have the virtue of not making
the term "Advice"  superfluous.
In any event,  the relevant provisions of the text are too ambiguous
to be decisive on the question of the Senate's role.  That issue will have to
be resolved on the basis of the kinds of considerations of history, structure,
and practicality that we discussed in our earlier essay.
Finally, Professor McGinnis suggests that we are mistaken in saying
that  a  nominee  bears  the  burden  of proof  because,  in  his  view,  the
Appointments  Clause makes  it difficult  for the Senate to reject a judicial
nominee  without  "compelling  reasons."21  This  is  so,  according  to
Professor McGinnis,  because  a "political burden"  is placed  on the Senate
whenever  it publicly  rejects  a presidential  choice.'  We agree with both
of these points.  But again they are,  we think,  essentially irrelevant to the
Senate's  assessment  of its  constitutional  responsibilities.  In  general,  it
seems  quite  sensible  to  say  that  a nominee  should  be  rejected  only for
"special  and  strong  reasons."'  But  under  the  extremely  unusual  cir-
cumstances  of the recent  past,'  we believe that such reasons  exist if the
nominee  is unable  to  show that he would add  quality  and  an  appropriate
degree of intellectual diversity to the Supreme Court.  No one has a right
to serve on the Court.  In the face of eleven consecutive  appointments by
Republican  Presidents,  a  Senate  controlled  by  the  Democrats  would  be
perfectly entitled to insist on its constitutional prerogatives-and  this is so
even if the Senate may face political barriers  to this course of action,  and
even if the President insists  on continuing to choose people of whom the
Senate disapproves.
II.  An Obligation to Ignore the Senate?
If Professor McGinnis's  first claim, that the President alone  makes
nominations to the Supreme Court,  is a truism that we do not and need not
dispute,  his  second  claim  is  more  nearly  the  opposite:  it seems  to  us
implausible.  This  is  the  claim  that  because  the  President  swears  to
"preserve,  protect and  defend the Constitution of the United States"'  he
is  "under  a  constitutional  obligation to  nominate  an  individual  who  he
believes will  interpret the Constitution in  a manner that generally  accords
21.  Id. at 655.
22.  Id. at 653.
23.  THE FE!RAUiST  No. 76, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,  1961).
24.  See supra text accompanying note 3.
25.  U.S.  CONST.  art. I1,  §  1, cl.  8.Texas Law Review
with his view  of its lawful  construction."'  Accordingly,  a President who
accepted  our  arguments  "and  agreed  with  the  Senate  in  advance  to
nominate a jurist whose constitutional views differed substantially from his
own would abrogate this most solemn oath."'
This is a striking claim.  It would mean,  to give just one example,
that unless President Hoover "substantially"  agreed with the principles of
early  Legal  Realism,  he violated his  oath  of  office  when he  nominated
Benjamin Cardozo to the Supreme Court.  In our view,  Professor McGin-
nis's  argument  rests  on  a simple  misunderstanding,  a  form  of category
mistake.  Professor McGinnis's reliance on the President's oath of office?
is a  makeweight  argument:  invoking  the oath just raises  the question  of
what the Constitution requires.  In order to determine the President's duty
under the Constitution-in this case, under  the Appointments Clause-one
must  interpret  that Clause,  using  all  appropriate  textual,  historical,  and
structural arguments.
Undoubtedly Presidents have certain obligations under the Appoint-
ments  Clause.  For example,  a President would surely violate the oath if
he nominated  a person who was  sworn to subvert the constitutional order.
And we do not think that it is unconstitutional for a President to seek,  as
recent Presidents have often sought, to nominate people whose jurispruden-
tial or ideological views agree with the President's.
But we do not see any basis at all for saying that the Appointments
Clause  makes  it unconstitutional  for  a  President  to  look  past  his  own
jurisprudential  conceptions  and  to  consider  other  factors:  a  nominee's
distinction; the Court's need for appropriate intellectual  diversity;  and the
fact that, on some constitutional matters,  the composition of the Congress,
not just that of the executive branch,  reflects the appropriate benchmark for
appointments  to  the  Supreme  Court.  Not  only  is  it  constitutionally
permissible for the President to act that way, but sometimes-such as in a
period  of prolonged  divided  government  when  one  party  has  made  an
unusually large number of consecutive appointments-such an approach is
more in keeping with the constitutional scheme.
The  contrary  understanding  of the  appointments  process  is,  we
think, responsible for some of the unfortunate aspects of that process as it
has been carried out in recent years.  We think the President and the Senate
can do better.
26.  McGinnis, supra  note 8,  at 647.
27.  Id.
28.  Id.
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